dakotagopher
07-21-2003, 08:46 PM
Hello, i have been away but now am back. Not much time to type, but found the following editorial interesting, thought it was worth posting. Are those of us that grow increasingly upset at Bush for lack of WMD and/or streatching the truth in his SOU speech being totally upfront and intellectually honest with ourselves about this situation?
The more I think on this, the more I think those that keep hammering on this issue are playing politics.
Would be interested in feedback/input on the following. Hope everyone is doing well & having a good summer.
Published July 19, 2003 Minneapolis Star Tribune
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration has come under fire for perceived intelligence failures. Critics have implied that, by using available intelligence, the government might have been able to prevent the attacks.
A great deal of intelligence before 9/11 did indicate that some sort of attack was imminent. Not all of it was from the most reliable of sources (information coming out of Afghanistan, for instance, was suspect).
But that wasn't a concern for those who thought that the administration had failed in its intelligence duties. They faulted the administration for not considering all available intelligence, tying together these disparate strings to foresee a threat and prevent it.
But isn't this exactly what the Bush administration did in the case of Iraq?
Now critics are harping because one of the many threads of intelligence that the administration used to make the case for preemptive action against Iraq has turned out not to have been accurate.
If the Niger uranium connection was the foundation that the case for war was built on, then perhaps they'd have a point. But it wasn't. It was merely another plank in a very long bridge that was used to justify action. Should the whole structure be torn down because one plank was rotten?
Back to 9/11 for a moment: Let us imagine that the administration had correctly interpreted the intelligence before 9/11 and decided that a major attack was going to take place in the United States and decided to act to prevent it.
None of the intelligence spelled out the exact plans for the attacks or the identity of the 19 men who would take part.
The only methods that I can see that would have prevented the attacks would have been a dramatic heightening of airport security and the mass detentions of thousands of Arab and Muslim men in the United States (imagine the outcry that would have resulted).
Unless the administration was very lucky and happened to nab at least one of the 19 with evidence of the detailed plans for the attacks, no one could really say just what had been prevented.
Before 9/11, it wasn't possible to imagine 9/11. The administration would have claimed credit for preventing a major terrorist attack and justified the actions used to do so.
But critics would have sniped that they'd overreacted, that there wasn't solid proof of a threat -- and if any of the intelligence used to build the case for action turned out to be false, the critics would be all over them just as they are today over the Iraq intelligence flap.
That's the problem with intelligence and preemption.
If you act on intelligence that is possibly not 100 percent accurate, you will be criticized. But if you don't act on intelligence that is possibly not 100 percent accurate, you will be criticized as well.
To quote Bart Simpson's famous paradox, "Damned if you do. Damned if you don't."
After 9/11, I'm much more willing to live with the former.
Chad Doughty, St. Louis Park, is a material planning manager.
The more I think on this, the more I think those that keep hammering on this issue are playing politics.
Would be interested in feedback/input on the following. Hope everyone is doing well & having a good summer.
Published July 19, 2003 Minneapolis Star Tribune
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration has come under fire for perceived intelligence failures. Critics have implied that, by using available intelligence, the government might have been able to prevent the attacks.
A great deal of intelligence before 9/11 did indicate that some sort of attack was imminent. Not all of it was from the most reliable of sources (information coming out of Afghanistan, for instance, was suspect).
But that wasn't a concern for those who thought that the administration had failed in its intelligence duties. They faulted the administration for not considering all available intelligence, tying together these disparate strings to foresee a threat and prevent it.
But isn't this exactly what the Bush administration did in the case of Iraq?
Now critics are harping because one of the many threads of intelligence that the administration used to make the case for preemptive action against Iraq has turned out not to have been accurate.
If the Niger uranium connection was the foundation that the case for war was built on, then perhaps they'd have a point. But it wasn't. It was merely another plank in a very long bridge that was used to justify action. Should the whole structure be torn down because one plank was rotten?
Back to 9/11 for a moment: Let us imagine that the administration had correctly interpreted the intelligence before 9/11 and decided that a major attack was going to take place in the United States and decided to act to prevent it.
None of the intelligence spelled out the exact plans for the attacks or the identity of the 19 men who would take part.
The only methods that I can see that would have prevented the attacks would have been a dramatic heightening of airport security and the mass detentions of thousands of Arab and Muslim men in the United States (imagine the outcry that would have resulted).
Unless the administration was very lucky and happened to nab at least one of the 19 with evidence of the detailed plans for the attacks, no one could really say just what had been prevented.
Before 9/11, it wasn't possible to imagine 9/11. The administration would have claimed credit for preventing a major terrorist attack and justified the actions used to do so.
But critics would have sniped that they'd overreacted, that there wasn't solid proof of a threat -- and if any of the intelligence used to build the case for action turned out to be false, the critics would be all over them just as they are today over the Iraq intelligence flap.
That's the problem with intelligence and preemption.
If you act on intelligence that is possibly not 100 percent accurate, you will be criticized. But if you don't act on intelligence that is possibly not 100 percent accurate, you will be criticized as well.
To quote Bart Simpson's famous paradox, "Damned if you do. Damned if you don't."
After 9/11, I'm much more willing to live with the former.
Chad Doughty, St. Louis Park, is a material planning manager.